

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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USIA-15 EUR-25 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2880

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 4604

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT
OF 10 MAY 1974.

FROM US REP MBFR

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PLENARY PRESENTATION TO BE MADE
BY THE UK REP ON 22 MAY. BEGIN TEXT.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

ONE OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY RECURRING THEMES IN THE STATEMENTS
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH SIDES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS THE
IMPORTANCE WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS ATTACH TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. THIS IS QUITE NATURAL, SINCE ANY AGREEMENT
REACHED AS A RESULT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DIRECTLY AFFECT THE
SECURITY OF EVERY PARTICIPANT. THE GOVERNMENTS WHICH MY COLLEAGUES
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AND I REPRESENT DEVELOPED THE WESTERN PROPOSALS ON PHASING

PRECISELY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT IN THE AGREED COMMUNIQUE OF 28 JUNE 1973 THAT ANY ARRANGEMENTS RESULTING FROM THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST "IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY". INDEED IT IS THE AGREED PURPOSE OF BOTH SIDES THAT THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE NOT MERELY MAINTAINED BUT ENHANCED BY THE RESULTS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

THIS LEADS TO THE PRACTICAL QUESTION OF JUST HOW SECURITY CAN BEST BE PRESERVED AND ENHANCED. TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION, WE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF TODAY SECURITY DOES NOT LIE MERELY IN THE POSSESSION OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES. IN AN AGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EVEN THE WINNER OF A WAR MIGHT WELL BE LARGELY DESTROYED. THE ONLY SURE WAY TO ENHANCE SECURITY IS TO TAKE MEASURES WHICH WILL REDUCE THE RISK OF ARMED CONFLICT OF ANY KIND. IN SHORT, SECURITY IS DIRECTLY DEPENDENT ON STABILITY. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS MORE STABLE THE WHOLE OF EUROPE WILL BENEFIT. THE SECURITY OF EACH ONE OF OUR COUNTRIES IS THUS INSEPARABLE FROM INTERNATIONAL STABILITY.

STABILITY IS RECIPROCAL. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE TO BECOME MORE STABLE FOR ONE SIDE AND AT THE SAME TIME LESS STABLE FOR THE OTHER. THIS IS WHY MY COLLEAGUES AND I ARE PUZZLED BY EASTERN REFERENCES TO "UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES". IF THE OUTCOME OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS TO INCREASE STABILITY, THEN IT WILL BE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. IF THE OUTCOME WERE TO DIMINISH STABILITY, THEN ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD FIND THEIR SECURITY DIMINISHED.

WHAT IS IN OUR VIEW OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE IS THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY SHOULD APPLY NOT ONLY TO THE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS, BUT ALSO TO THEIR OUTCOME. IT WOULD BE POINTLESS FOR THE PRINCIPLE TO BE APPLIED THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS IF THE FINAL GOAL OF THIS PROCESS COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS PROVIDING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY ON A DURABLE BASIS THUS ENSURING GREATER STABILITY.

AS MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE FREQUENTLY OBSERVED, THE MAJOR SOURCE OF INSTABILITY IN EUROPE TODAY IS THE IMBALANCE IN

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GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN AN AGE OF OVERALL NUCLEAR PARITY, IT IS THIS INEQUALITY THAT CARRIES WITH IT THE GREATEST RISK OF LEADING TO AN ARMED CONFLICT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE WAY TO ENHANCE STABILITY, AND THUS TO INCREASE THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS, IS TO REDRESS THIS CRUCIAL IMBALANCE.

MEASURES TO REDRESS THIS IMBALANCE MUST BE THE BASIS OF ANY AGREEMENT. WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED BY THE ABSENCE SO FAR

OF ANY SIGN FROM THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS THAT THEY ARE READY TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT. THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT OF THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS POINT FOR ANY AGREEMENT.

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ARGUED THAT, IN ANY REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT, THE EXISTING FORCE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE PRESERVED INTACT; AND THAT FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REDUCTIONS BY EACH SIDE MUST BE PROPORTIONATELY EQUAL. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS APPROACH WOULD ONLY LEAD TO AN INEQUITABLE OUTCOME. FOR SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT ONLY MAINTAIN THE EXISTING WARSAW PACT SUPERIORITY IN GROUND FORCES; THEY WOULD ACTUALLY AGGRAVATE THE EFFECTS OF THAT SUPERIORITY. SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD BE MANIFESTLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

TO AVOID THIS INEQUITABLE OUTCOME, REDUCTIONS SHOULD RESULT IN AN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. IT IS A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE EXPRESSED IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EITHER SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD BE SELF-EVIDENTLY FAIR. IT WOULD CONSTITUTE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVED STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND, AS SUCH, IT COULD NOT FAIL TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS. HUMES

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 4604

FROM US REP MBFR

MR CHAIRMAN, ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, AND OF THE NEED TO TAKE A SUBSTANTIAL STEP TOWARDS THE COMMON CEILING IN A FIRST PHASE OF REDUCTIONS, WOULD BE THE BEST POSSIBLE PLEDGE OF THE DETERMINATION OF BOTH SIDES TO IMPROVE STABILITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF ALL. THE EQUILIBRIUM IN GROUND FORCES WHICH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON CEILING WOULD PRODUCE WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE TEMPTATION TO USE, OR THREATEN TO USE, FORCE IN ANY FUTURE SITUATION OF CRISIS. BY THUS REDUCING THE RISK OF CONFLICT, WITH ALL ITS ATTENDANT DANGERS OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISCALCULATION, IT WOULD ALSO REDUCE THE RISK OF ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR WAR. IT WOULD THUS ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS AND IMPART TO BOTH SIDES A WELL-FOUNDED CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE STABILITY OF CENTRAL EUROPE.

THERE HAS IN RECENT YEARS BEEN A WELCOME IMPROVEMENT IN
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RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN EUROPE. BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO PRETEND THAT THIS IMPROVEMENT HAS REMOVED ALL THE MISTRUST AND ANXIETIES WHICH HAVE RESULTED FROM THE PREVIOUS 25 YEARS OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION, OF WHICH CENTRAL EUROPE HAS BEEN THE FOCAL POINT. MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IS STILL LACKING; AND THIS LACK OF CONFIDENCE IS DUE IN LARGE PART TO THE FACT THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CORRESPONDING IMPROVEMENT IN THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

THE MILITARY REALITIES CANNOT JUST BE IGNORED. THE FORCES MAINTAINED BY THE WARSAW PACT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT PRESENT STAND AT THEIR HIGHEST LEVEL IN 20 YEARS. THE WARSAW PACT HAS ABOUT 20 PERCENT MORE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA THAN THE WEST, AND A SUPERIORITY OF ABOUT TWO AND A HALF TO ONE IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THIS SUPERIORITY IS FURTHER ENHANCED BY THE IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY TO THE AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION, WITH ITS ENORMOUS MILITARY RESOURCES READILY AVAILABLE FOR MOBILISATION AND REINFORCEMENT; WHEREAS THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY POWER ON THE WESTERN SIDE, THE UNITED STATES, LIES NEARLY 5,000 KILOMETRES AWAY ACROSS THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

THE PRESENT IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE CAN ONLY BE SEEN AS ANACHRONISTIC AND DESTABILISING. THE PERPETUATION OF THIS IMBALANCE WOULD INEVITABLY

PERPETUATE ALSO THE MISTRUST AND ANXIETIES WHICH IT HAS REFLECTED, AND TO WHICH IT HAS CONTRIBUTED. IT IS SIMPLY NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO BIND THEMSELVES BY A SOLEMN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO MAINTAIN UNDISTURBED A FORCE RELATIONSHIP WHICH WOULD LEAVE THEM AT SO GREAT A MILITARY DISADVANTAGE.

FOR WE MUST REMEMBER THAT ANY AGREEMENT WHICH WE SUCCEED IN REACHING HERE WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF LIMITING THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENTS IN A NUMBER OF VERY IMPORTANT RESPECTS. CERTAIN OF THE OPTIONS HITHERTO OPEN TO THEM IN THE DEFENCE FIELD WILL BE CLOSED. IF THEY ARE TO ACCEPT RESTRICTIONS OF THIS KIND, THEY WILL WANT TO BE SATISFIED THAT THEY ARE DOING SO IN THE CONTEXT OF AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDES A RELIABLE AND LASTING BASIS FOR STABILITY, AND NOT ONE WHICH MERELY PERPETUATES THE SUPERIORITY OF ONE SIDE OVER THE OTHER.

THIS THEN IS THE BACKGROUND TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL THAT THE
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GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH SHOULD BE SPECIFIED IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, SHOULD BE A COMMON CEILING ON THE OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF EITHER SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, TO BE REACHED IN TWO SUCESSIVE PHASES. IT IS ALSO THE EXPLANATION OF WHY WE BELIEVE THAT REDUCTIONS MUST, FROM THEIR OUTSET, RELECT MOVEMENT TOWARDS THAT GOAL. TO REDUCE AND THEREFORE TO LIMIT OUR FORCES WITHOUT THE ASSURANCE THAT WE WERE REDUCING TOWARDS A RELATIONSHIP OF APPROXIMATE EQUALITY WOULD BE TO DIMINISH OUR OWN SECURITY AND TO PUT THE STABILITY OF CENTRAL EUROPE AT RISK.

AGREEMENT THAT THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABLE EQUILIBRIUM IN GROUND FORCES WILL PROVIDE THE ASSURANCE WHICH WE, ON THE WESTERN SIDE, MUST HAVE BEFORE WE CAN BEGIN THE REDUCTIONS PROCESS. FOR IF WE ARE TO EMBARK ON FORCE REDUCTIONS, WE MUST BE CONFIDENT THAT THE END RESULT OF THOSE REDUCTIONS WILL BE EQUITABLE; THAT IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY; AND THAT IT WILL LEAVE OUR SECURITY UNDIMINISHED. THE APPROACH ADVOCATED BY EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD NOT PROVIDE US WITH THE CONFIDENCE WHICH WE NEED.

I HOPE THAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WILL GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO WHAT I HAVE SAID TODAY. MY COLLEAGUES AND I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATED THAT AN APPROXIMATELY EQUAL RELATIONSHIP IN GROUND FORCES IS THE ONLY OUTCOME TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. IN OUR VIEW, ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEED TO MOVE TOWARDS SUCH A RELATIONSHIP IS ONE OF THE CENTRAL ISSUES ON WHICH PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DEPEND. RECOGNITION OF THIS NEED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD TOWARDS THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF OUR COMMON TASK. END TEXT HUMES

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